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How the social media posts from IDF helped Hamas to penetrate the border base in Gaza into the Gaza -defense messages

How the social media posts from IDF helped Hamas to penetrate the border base in Gaza into the Gaza -defense messages

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IDF soldiers left so many markers on social media that the Hamas invaders on October 7 had a complete breakdown of almost every unit, the subunit and the building within the Nahan OZ IDF base when they overwhelmed, killed 53 soldiers and took 10 hostages on October 7, 2023.

16 of the dead were female field observers, many killed when Hamas burned the building in which they were, and some of the hostages were among the recently released female hostages as part of the ceasefire on January 19. Two officers and five soldiers escape the combustion situations by breaking and sneaking out a bathroom window.

The social media descriptions were so complete, often simply from photos, the soldiers at various buildings on their first or last day in one position that the official IDF probe of the fight came to the conclusion that Hamas did not need a single spy to reduce its highly specific infiltration plan.

In this respect, the surveys of the Hamas prisoners and the confiscation of other physical Hamas objects that the IDF found while entering Gaza led to the fact that Hamas could build a model of parts of the base to practice their invasion, just like Israeli special forces before the operation.

This made it possible for Hamas to significantly improve their tactical planning for an invasion of Licher OZ, far beyond the already significant analysis that they had carried out in the plans 2021-2022 and was able to quote exactly how long it takes certain IDF reinforcements to collect and which soldiers are stationed in the early and second stage of the invasion.

The observation post by Naunte Oz, which was reopened in Camp Reim (loan: IDF spokesman)

The Hamas knew where the generators and video cameras of the base were, where the safe spaces were, how and when the patrols moved, where the basic commander and the company commander slept, where the coordination room was and more.

In a Hamas document it says that the IDF's ability to assemble an organized defense in the area quickly falls apart if you have managed to quickly overwhelm the Laach OZ base and the forces in Yiftach.

The Hamas overcame the soldiers in Nahale OZ in three waves after having hit the first wave around 6:30 a.m. with around 65 rockets between 6:30 a.m. and 7:05 a.m.

The Israeli armed forces were initially distracted by the rocket attack, showing video material how they were very quiet in safe rooms, but almost no precautionary measures to take positions to protect themselves from a soil invasion.

At 6:45 a.m., the Hamas invaders gathered in considerable numbers from several sides of the base to attack the base at the same time on two fronts.

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At that time, many IDF soldiers only turned towards defense spots on the wall of the base and already had them ready by Hamas for their arrival.

The two-sided Hamas attack also forced the Israeli armed forces within the basis of sharing their defense.

The soldiers who were stationed at the base at the time of the invasion included a group from the 13th battalion of the Golani brigade, two tanks and a field collection from the battalion 414.

In total, the IDF had around 162 soldiers in and around the Laach Oz base, but only 81 of them were trained as a fighting fighter, and only 90 weapons had scandalous.

This edition in which so many soldiers were so close to the border without weapons was one of the first to ensure that after analyzing the catastrophe on October 7, it made it changed.

Next, the situation was even worse, since only a few dozen fighters actually take positions along the wall to protect the base, with most of the armed soldiers and all unarmed soldiers input in different partly safe buildings within the base.

Although from a perspective, taking these positions in the event of a small attempt to infiltrate the base follows a certain procedure that the main scenario was of an expected invasion, if available, in view of the several sets of dozens of Hamas invaders, it made no sense to break the base walls on several pages.

The tanks were not used effectively because the Hamas invaders had already started to penetrate the base at the time of time when they were occupied and operated on, so that an opportunity for the maximum use of the tank on the invader before they arrived at the base had already been missed.

One of the tanks was outside the base and did not return in time to make a difference, while the tank killed a small number of Hamas invaders within the base, but then the standard procedure for taking a position outside the base to thwart further intruders and not to recognize how desperate the situation within the base became.

In a short time, the Hamas used armor defense rockets, grenades and shots to kill the small resistance pockets on the land walls and break through several directions into the base.

Zeitliten: How the Hamas devastated through the Naunte Oz Base

At 7:30 a.m., Hamas also entered the main gate to the base.

The IDF shared the first stage of the fight in 6:29 a.m. to 8:20 a.m., the initial penetration and the initial battles in the base, which included around 35 different undermates, with around half a dozen more important and longer fighting.

Next, the IDF framed the time from 8:20 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. as continuous in the battle, including at 10:20 a.m., when the Hamas took seven female viewpoints and a three -person -armor crew as hostages.

The third stage took place from 12 p.m. to 8 p.m. when the Israeli forces steadily regained control and overwhelmed the Hamas invaders.

Battalion 890 Malatrooper and Tamam Special Combat Police Forces set off in waves in particular between 12:00 p.m. and 1:36 p.m. Most intruders were killed or cleared until 5:00 p.m.

A unique aspect of the Laach Oz fight is that the viewpoints because the IDF was involved in IT knew exactly what the invaders did in real time minute after minute.

At 6:31 a.m., the female viewpoints reported the Hamas invaders through the fence opposite the Laach OZ base. Almost immediately afterwards they reported that a whole cell of the invaders flowed through.

The reigning commander based on all nearby positions and the Brigade command center reported that “a complex situation” developed.

At 6:33 a.m., viewpoints reported that a whole in another part of the border fence was blown.

At 6:37 a.m. they made additional reports about breaks in the fence.

At 6:39 a.m., the viewpoints reported that dozens of additional invaders flow into the Israeli area.

At around 6:38 a.m., the base did not complete any mortar in the invaders before they arrived near the ground walls, partly because one of the basic commanders was from the base and had taken parts of the communication equipment.

This meant that it was not possible to fire the mortar in good time.

A scene of destruction in Kibbutz Laach Oz after the Hamas attack on October 7th. Due to the lack of critical thinking, the Kibbuz experienced slaughter, which is almost too painful to understand this, the writer claims. (Credit: Yonatan Sindel/Flash90)

Next, the female prospects reported that there were five separate breaks in the border fence.

Unfortunately, the brigade office did not pass these reports on the headquarters of the division, the IDF Southern Command or the IDF High Command, and the situation was not clear until much later on higher levels.

The IDF probe found that several forces have withdrawn in the base and near the base instead of facing the invaders head-on.

However, the probe also found that many of the fighters fought bravely in the base and that the female viewing committees, despite the pressure under which they were, created reports defined in view of the pressure.

The IDF probe found that the situation space was built to resist the rocket fire, but not a floor invasion, a blatant error in view of the view of how close the base was on the border. In addition, the IDF prospects in the event of an invasion had not received any combat training or planning.

Most most important IDF commanders on and around the base were killed during the battle.



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