The investigation of the Israeli army shows that Kfar Aza reveals a failure in defense of Kfar Aza on October 7th

By Palestine Chronicle Stab

The Israeli channel 14 reported that the investigations carried out by the Israeli army only reveal a small part of the wider failure.

An internal examination of the Israeli occupation army resulted in a massive failure in defending the Kfar Aza Kibbuz during the operational operation of the Palestinian resistance on October 7, 2023 as part of the OL-AQSA Operation Flood.

According to Israeli media, the investigation has revealed that when they arrived at the scene of the crime, they stood significant challenges in connection with coordination and communication with their commanders.

According to reports, this disorganization reported to situations in which the army yields hesitated to deal with around 250 Palestinian resistance fighters.

The attack led to the death of 62 people, 18 injuries and the capture of 19 others.

The times of Israel found that two Israeli prisoners “were later wrongly killed by Israeli troops from Kfar Aza when they tried to escape their kidnappers in the Gaza”.

According to the Israeli newspaper, “the probe came to the conclusion that the IDF had failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kfar Aza, especially because the military had never prepared for such an event”.

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A timeline of events

After examining the army, the attack on Kfar Aza began shortly before 7 a.m. on October 7, 2023 and only ended in the afternoon of October 10th.

The attack allegedly started at 6:30 a.m. with a flood of around 1,000 rockets, which mainly aimed at Israeli military positions. Palestinian fighter injured 114 locations along the border barrier of Israel, with a violation of 6:43 a.m., so that they could enter Kfar Aza.

At 6:42 a.m., six Palestinian fighters arrived over paragliders in Kfar Aza and fly across the border under the cover of the rocket fire.

At 6:45 a.m., three Israeli military patrol vehicles were instructed to reach Kfar Aza, but a vehicle was attacked on the way, and the other two were involved in Sderot.

At 6:50 a.m., the fighters injured two entrances against Kfar Aza: one near the solar arm of Kibbutz and the other in the southwest. Pickup trucks arrived to both entrances and unloaded fighters who infiltrated the community. At 7 a.m. there were between 50 and 80 Palestinian fighters in Kfar Aza.

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At 7:01 a.m., an Israeli tank, which was stationed near Kfar Aza, opened the fire to the fighter, but did not enter the Kibbutz. At 10:20 a.m., the tank was instructed to leave the area and help elsewhere after the regional commander was killed.

In the meantime, the members of the Kibbuz security personnel were killed.

At 8 a.m., about 150 Palestinian fighters had infiltrated the Kibbutz.

The first group of 18 IDF soldiers from the Golani Brigade only arrived at 8:33 a.m., but it took a few more hours for the situation to be fully under control.

In the probe it was found that the Israeli army only regained control of the settlement the next morning after the Palestinian fighters had already withdrawn to the Gaza Strip.

In addition, the air strikes of the Israeli Air Force near the Kfar Aza settlement could not change the course of fighting or prevent the attack.

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Only 10% showed

Previously, the Israeli channel 14 reported that the investigations carried out by the Israeli army only reveal a small part of the wider failure.

According to Al-Jazeera, the channel found that only about 10% of the full list of errors were published, although a much larger and more difficult upset is not yet understandable.

The investigation and the following revelations have made it clear that the failure of the Israeli military was not limited to the night of October 7, 2023. In fact, the defects have accumulated over a period of more than a decade, and the channel emphasized that this failure in Israeli military construction is deeply rooted.

The military secret services, Aman, reported that even after completing their investigations, they still do not completely understand the armed organizations that work within the Gaza Strip.

Secret service officers within the division admitted that the Israeli army had entered war without a comprehensive understanding of the enemy, to whom she was confronted.

This lack of knowledge of Palestinian resistance movements is described as a critical topic that explains why Hamas remains a strong force in the region.

According to these secret service officials, this big gap in understanding is a key factor for the persistence of Hamas and its ability to continue operating despite Israeli efforts to reduce it.

(PC, Aja)